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THE SOMETIMES “CRAVEN WATCHDOG”:
THE DISPARATE CRIMINAL-CIVIL
APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
S. NATHAN WILLIAMS†
ABSTRACT
Increasingly, courts must decide whether U.S. law applies
extraterritorially. Courts largely resolve questions of extraterritorial
scope using tools of statutory construction. Of these tools, the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been ascendant. However,
this presumption is subject to two divergent lines of cases: Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd. affirmed the strict operation of the
presumption in civil cases, but United States v. Bowman continues to
govern the presumption’s looser role in criminal cases, thereby
creating a doctrinal asymmetry. This Note furthers the argument that
courts should reconcile Morrison and Bowman, by laying out three
arguments for why an expansive Bowman exception is problematic
and unsustainable. First, the two lines of cases create unjustified
doctrinal incoherencies, given the interrelated contexts in which the
presumption is applied and the rationales underlying the
presumption. Second, an expansive exception to the presumption in
criminal contexts undermines the smart allocation of authority
between the branches of government. Finally, an expansive Bowman
exception runs counter to the tradition of offering fair notice of
criminal law’s prohibitions. This Note asserts that these arguments
counsel for the abrogation or, at least, substantial narrowing of the
Bowman exception, to harmonize it with Morrison’s stricter vision of
the presumption against extraterritoriality.
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INTRODUCTION
Four men sailing to Brazil hatch a plot on the high seas to
1
defraud their employer. An international civil servant solicits a bribe
2
in Afghanistan. A father sexually abuses his daughter while traveling
3
with her in Europe. A Liberian dictator’s son tortures Liberian and
4
Sierra Leonean citizens suspected of opposing his father’s rule. Each
of these actions is based on actual events, and each violates U.S.
criminal law, although none was perpetrated within the United States’
territorial boundaries. Extraterritoriality describes the capacity of
U.S. law to apply abroad, and, as the previous examples illustrate, it
can have, as a feature of legislation, implications for criminal liability,
national sovereignty, and international relations.
Although the extension of national law outside national borders
5
has existed for more than two hundred years, the practice of law is
witnessing a resurgent invocation of extraterritorial legislation of both
6
modern and historic vintage. The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a statute
originating in the eighteenth century and assigning federal courts
jurisdiction to hear civil suits against aliens for violations of
7
international law, has been the subject of argument and reargument
at the Supreme Court regarding its application of the ATS to a
8
corporation’s alleged support for violence in Africa. Meanwhile, the
9
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) languished in
obscurity for a quarter-century before reemerging as a premier tool
10
for punishing bribery of foreign officials, ensnaring the likes of Wal-

1. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 95–96 (1922).
2. See United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 297 (D.D.C. 2011).
3. See United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2011).
4. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793–94 (11th Cir. 2010).
5. Cf. Schooner Exch. v. M‘Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 127 (1812) (“There is no
instance of [a sovereign’s laws’] actual extra-territorial operation, except where by fiction of law
it is supposed to be territorial, or at most where it exclusively operates upon its own subjects.”).
6. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
7. The ATS was originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat.
73, 77.
8. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (2012).
10. Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 909, 913
(2010); see FCPA DIGEST: CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN
OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, at v, vii (Philip Urofsky
et al. eds., 2012), available at http://shearman.symplicity.com/files/68c/68cf1e693fcaa
178acbd6d852a86b084.pdf (describing the dramatic increase in enforcement against individuals
and companies in the last decade).
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11

Mart Stores, Avon Products, and Siemens AG. Extraterritorial
statutes can fulfill important functions in the nation’s legal regime—
such as achieving foreign policy goals, or closing off loopholes created
by the ease of international travel and commerce—just as they can
create risks that individuals and companies will be subject to
12
conflicting legal obligations or that other states will be upset by the
13
perceivable intrusion of U.S. legal norms within their own borders.
Although there is no dispute regarding Congress’s constitutional
14
competence to legislate beyond the nation’s borders, there are
serious consequences to such extraterritorial prescription, prompting
judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended a law to have farreaching geographical scope. Courts look to the language of the
15
statute for manifestations of such intent. Yet, when a court must
construe a geoambiguous statute—that is, one lacking a clear
16
indication of geographical scope —it invokes the presumption
against extraterritoriality. This judicial rule of interpretation
construes the lack of express extraterritorial scope as a presumptive
indication that Congress intended the statute’s prescriptions to be
17
applicable only to domestic activity.
Nevertheless, the approach to applying this statutory canon is
not monolithic; rather, two lines of jurisprudence govern the
determination of extraterritoriality. The first line of cases—refined in
18
2010 by Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. and discussed in

11. Leslie Wayne, Hits, and Misses, in a War on Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at
BU1.
12. Cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (holding that a court’s
refusal to apply domestic law abroad, on the basis of international comity, requires a finding of
“true conflict” between national and foreign legislation). But see id. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(eschewing the Hartford majority’s true-conflict approach and invoking, instead, a less stringent,
multifactor analysis based on statutory construction and directed at the “reasonableness” of the
legislature’s prescriptive jurisdiction).
13. See Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 505, 505–06 (1998) (summarizing the
legislative and diplomatic reactions to the international reach of U.S. antitrust laws).
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 114 (2010) (“‘[G]eoambiguous’
laws . . . proscribe or regulate conduct but . . . remain silent about whether they apply to acts
that occur outside of the United States.”).
17. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
18. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. —embodies the general rule of
strictly constraining statutes to domestic application, absent clear and
20
contrary language. The second line of cases—descending from
21
United States v. Bowman —employs an “exception” to this general
22
rule for certain classes of criminal offenses. These two cases and
their progeny stand in uneasy juxtaposition and evince conflicting
23
principles.
This Note argues in four Parts that, for reasons of doctrinal
coherence, smart allocation of governmental authority, and fair
notice, the lax Bowman exception should be substantially narrowed
24
or eliminated. In terms of the two lines of cases that supposedly
form a common doctrine, Morrison’s bright-line rule and Bowman’s
porous standard are conceptually and practically incoherent,
especially when they collide, for example, in the context of a statute
that imposes criminal and civil liability. Likewise, the asymmetry that
courts currently tolerate runs counter to constitutional guidance and
prudential considerations as to the allocation of governmental
authority and fair notice. With that in mind, Part I discusses the legal
foundation for Congress’s authority to enact laws with extraterritorial
effect. Part II, then, describes how courts have used the presumption
against extraterritoriality to limit the scope of civil and criminal
statutes, respectively, when Congress has not clearly indicated the
statutes’ geographic reach. In Part III, this Note explains how
Morrison recharacterized and refined courts’ use of the presumption
in civil contexts, and how courts have refused to extend Morrison’s
holding to criminal cases. Then, in Part IV.A, it examines the
recognized
rationales
behind
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality and, in Part IV.B, advocates on that basis that
principles of doctrinal coherence, smart allocation of authority, and
fair notice militate against perpetuation of the current asymmetries
19. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
20. See Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248 (“It is a longstanding principle of American law
‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 282,
285 (1949))).
21. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
22. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 291 (1952).
23. See infra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
24. This Note does not address whether conduct captured within the scope of
geoambiguous criminal statutes is deserving of punishment. Conceptually, it is beyond the
concerns of this Note. Practically, extraterritorial statutes are varied in substance, and such a
topic would require more exacting treatment than this Note could give it.
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created by the Bowman exception. Finally, Part IV.C introduces and,
in turn, discounts two alternative proposals to the one advocated in
this Note.
I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY: BOUNDED PRESCRIPTIVE AUTHORITY
The U.S. Constitution and international law provide both for
extraterritorial authority and ostensible constraints on its boundless
exercise. The U.S. Constitution directly confers on Congress the
25
authority to regulate extraterritorial activities in particular respects,
and the Supreme Court’s modern case law has recognized and
26
repeatedly affirmed such extraterritorial authority. The inherent
limits of the constitutional enumerations, affirmative due process
restrictions, and deference to international law circumscribe the
expansiveness of extraterritorial authority. However, none of these
constitutional and international principles vigorously constrains
Congress, given the lack of constitutional clarity and the dualistic
approach to international law.
The doctrine of enumerated powers structurally constrains the
federal government’s extraterritorial authority just as it constrains its
27
domestic authority. The enumerations that confer extraterritorial
28
authority are the Define and Punish Clause, the Foreign Commerce

25. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cls. 3, 10, 18.
26. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins., Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813–14 (1993) (“Congress
has broad power under Article I, § 8, cl. 3, ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ and
this Court has repeatedly upheld its power to make laws applicable to persons or activities
beyond our territorial boundaries where United States interests are affected.”); EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Congress has the authority to [extend the force
of] its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”). However, the Supreme
Court was initially schizophrenic in its recognition of Congress’s extraterritorial authority.
Compare Schooner Exch. v. M‘Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 127 (1812) (“There is no
instance of [a sovereign’s laws’] actual extra-territorial operation, except where by fiction of law
it is supposed to be territorial, or at most where it exclusively operates upon its own subjects.”),
with Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234–35 (1804) (“The authority of a nation within
its own territory is absolute and exclusive. . . . [I]ts power to secure itself from injury, may
certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory. . . . [Such exercise of power is acceptable
when the means] are such as are reasonable and necessary to secure their laws from
violation . . . .”).
27. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 94-166,
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 1–3 (2012) (situating
federal authority among several discrete, enumerated powers).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power “[t]o define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”).
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29

and—supplementary to another enumeration—the
Clause,
30
Necessary and Proper Clause. Neither the Define and Punish Clause
nor the Foreign Commerce Clause has received substantial judicial
explication. Thus, whereas the Define and Punish Clause is limited by
31
its own terms to acts that offend “the Law of Nations” —
encompassing the expressly enumerated “Piracy and Felonies
32
committed on the high Seas” —the Supreme Court’s elucidation of
the Clause’s scope has characterized “the Law of Nations” as
international norms—generally accepted, specifically defined, and
33
capable of development. Therefore, the universal crimes subject to
its scope may be larger than the examples of the international acts
specifically condemned in its text or even those condemned by
34
international norms at the time of the Founding. The Foreign
Commerce Clause has been, likewise, neglected by judicial
35
examination. However, an analogy to the Domestic Commerce
Clause is irresistible. Therefore, the principal restriction on the
Foreign Commerce Power would likely be the condition that the
regulated activity demonstrates a substantial effect on U.S.
36
commerce.
29. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations”).
30. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof”).
31. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
32. Id.; see also Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 121,
137 (2007) (describing piracy as the “paramount offense against the law of nations at the time of
the founding”).
33. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (bounding the scope of the ATS
to “any claim based on the present-day law of nations . . . rest[ing] on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized”); see also Colangelo, supra note 32,
at 137–38 (describing the ATS as derivative of Congress’s Define and Punish power and
grounded on “an evolving body of norms”).
34. See Colangelo, supra note 32, at 139–42 (asserting that slavery is one such universally
recognized offense and arguing that terrorism should be another).
35. See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is not so much that
the contours of the Foreign Commerce Clause are crystal clear, but rather that their scope has
yet to be subjected to judicial scrutiny.”); id. (“Cases involving the reach of the Foreign
Commerce Clause vis-a-vis congressional authority to regulate our citizens’ conduct abroad are
few and far between.”).
36. Colangelo, supra note 32, at 157. The constitutional threshold for invoking the Foreign
Commerce Clause is at least as high as (and ostensibly higher than) the threshold for invoking
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By comparison, the Necessary and Proper Clause may be the
best understood of the three enumerations because its scope has been
37
explored in the domestic context. The Necessary and Proper Clause
confers augmentative authority to cure constitutional defects in
enactments coming under the auspices of other substantive
38
constitutional powers. Therefore, its relevance may arise in
combination with either of the two constitutional provisions described
above or others, such as those contained in the Taxing Clause, Treaty
39
Clause, or Raising Armies Clause. Irrespective of the constitutional
power that it augments, the Necessary and Proper Clause requires a
“means-end fit[] between the legislation and the valid governmental
40
objective.”
In contrast, due process is an affirmative constraint on
congressional prescriptions, but courts have not provided a clear and
41
consistent approach to effectuating due process limitations abroad.
Whereas U.S. citizens are entitled to due process protections, whether
42
at home or abroad, aliens abroad have not been extended the few
constitutional protections afforded to resident aliens in the United
43
States. Neither have courts of appeals coalesced around a general
the Domestic Commerce Clause; the former governs commerce “with foreign Nations,”
whereas the latter derives from commerce “among the several States.” Id. at 147–48 (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
37. For key decisions construing the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–93 (2012); Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 34–37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,
421–23 (1819).
38. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (“[T]he Clause gives Congress authority to ‘legislate on
that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution’ . . . .” (quoting
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 411)).
39. DOYLE, supra note 27, at 3 nn.17–18.
40. Colangelo, supra note 32, at 152–53.
41. See DOYLE, supra note 27, at 5 (“[M]any of the cases do little more than note that due
process restrictions mark the frontier of the authority to enact and enforce American law
abroad.”).
42. J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO.
L.J. 463, 468 (2007).
43. Compare United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (enumerating
the due process entitlements accorded to resident aliens), with id. at 269, 274–75 (refusing to
extend the Fifth Amendment’s privileges to aliens located abroad or to make Fourth
Amendment search and seizure protections applicable to aliens without voluntary connections
to the United States). The exception may be due process protections accorded to aliens when
prosecuted in an Article III court. See id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[When] [t]he
United States is prosecuting a foreign national in a court established under Article III, and all of
the trial proceedings are governed by the Constitution[,] . . . the dictates of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant.”).
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theory of extraterritorial due process rights, with some concluding
that extraterritorial application of U.S. law must “not be arbitrary or
45
fundamentally unfair” and others relying on other principles to limit
46
prosecution of foreign actions.
Finally, international law indirectly constrains extraterritoriality.
International law is not dispositive of the United States’ prescriptive
47
authority. Legitimacy under international law is, however, a relevant
consideration when interpreting U.S. statutes. Absent contrary
legislative intent, courts presume that Congress has legislated in
48
conformity with international law. Under international law, a state’s
regulatory powers are classified according to one of three types of
49
jurisdiction: prescriptive, adjudicatory, and enforcement. The
Supreme Court has clarified that extraterritorial application of U.S.
law is a function of prescriptive jurisdiction, rather than adjudicatory
50
or enforcement jurisdiction. As a matter of prescriptive jurisdiction,
the international legitimacy of a state’s prescriptive action is
constrained, in turn, by the jurisdictional principles on which a state

44. See Colangelo, supra note 32, at 162 (“[C]ourts have created a confused and ad hoc
jurisprudence in this area [of extraterritorial due process] with different Circuits espousing
different requirements . . . .”).
45. E.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 946 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (pointing to statutory
construction as a source of prosecutorial constraint).
47. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (holding that Congress may
expressly contradict international law or do so “implicitly by treaties or statutes that occupy the
field”).
48. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains . . . .”); see also Harford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is
generally presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law limits on
jurisdiction to prescribe.”).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
(1987).
50. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (rejecting lower
courts’ conclusions that extraterritorial application required a determination of subject matter
(that is, adjudicatory) jurisdiction, rather than a determination of a case’s merits (that is,
prescriptive jurisdiction)). The Court’s invocation of the presumption in Kiobel to decide the
scope of the ATS—a “strictly jurisdictional” statute—should not confuse this point. See Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013). The Court never questioned
Congress’s prescriptive capacity to enlarge the scope of the ATS. See id. at 1665 (“Congress,
even in a jurisdictional provision, can indicate that it intends federal law to apply to conduct
occurring abroad.”).
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51

bases its legislation. Laws regulating activity within a state’s own
52
borders or by its own nationals enjoy the strongest legitimacy,
whereas principles that are more tangentially related to a state’s
53
sovereign concerns yield decreasing support internationally. This
legitimacy is translated, via the Charming Betsy canon, into a
presumptive limitation—albeit rebuttable—on how liberally
54
legislation is construed. In practice, a court will employ the
Charming Betsy canon to construe a statute in a way that does not
55
violate international law.
Within this framework of constitutional and interpretive
constraints, the presumption against extraterritoriality plays its own
role. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a judicial canon for
56
construing the law consistent with legislative purpose. So, unlike the
express constitutional constraints, the presumption does not halt a
determined legislature. However, the constitutional and prudential
concerns embodied within the presumption against extraterritoriality
may give it greater normative weight than the Charming Betsy canon.
The presumption establishes a default scope of domestic legislation
57
but gives way to Congress’s contrary intent. In that sense, the

51. Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal
Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 143–45
(2011). International law recognizes five principles: (1) the territorial principle, (2) the
nationality principle, (3) the passive-personality principle, (4) the protective principle, and (5)
the universal principle. Id. For further discussion of these jurisdictional principles, see Curtis A.
Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 324; John H. Knox, A
Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 357 (2010).
52. CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO CRIME (Harvard Research in Int’l
Law, Draft 1935), in 29 AM. J. INT’L L. (SUPP.) 435, 445 (1935) (explaining that the territorial
and nationality principles have universal acceptance among states and offer primary
justifications for action).
53. See id. at 445 (noting that state acceptance of the protective, universal, and passivepersonality principles is lower and generally offers only “auxiliary competence”).
54. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains . . . .”).
55. See, e.g., Ali-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The only generally
applicable role for international law in statutory interpretation is the modest one afforded by
the Charming Betsy canon, which counsels courts, where fairly possible, to construe ambiguous
statutes so as not to conflict with international law.”).
56. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (observing that “canons
of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of
legislation” when statutory text is ambiguous).
57. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 17–18 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/
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presumption against extraterritoriality is largely agnostic as to what
Congress ultimately says and concerned only with how it says it. In
particular, the presumption is a rule animated by geoambiguity.
II. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY:
PRESCRIPTIVE INTENT
The geographical reach of U.S. law, then, is determined by
58
statutory construction, that is, an inquiry into the meaning of an
enacted law. The presumption against extraterritoriality describes the
interpretive rule that, unless otherwise expressed, statutes are
59
presumed to apply territorially only. Or as Justice Scalia has stated,
“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
60
application, it has none.” Implicit, yet axiomatic, to the operation of
the presumption are two principles. First, the presumption against
extraterritoriality is animated when a court is asked to apply a U.S.
law outside of U.S. borders. Second, evidence that Congress clearly
intended an extended reach for the law can rebut this extraterritorial
bar. In practice, the presumption has received various and liberal
treatment, varying by statute and context.
Three cases are salient to the presumption’s modern heritage.
61
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. initiated the extant line of
jurisprudence on the presumption, whereas Morrison is the Supreme
62
Court’s strong reaffirmation and clarification of it. In United States v.
Bowman, however, the Court drew an analogy to American Banana
and its civil jurisprudence, reasoning that the presumption against
extraterritoriality might not have precisely the same effect in the
63
criminal context. Since then, the presumption has had parallel but
distinct applications to civil and criminal statutes, notwithstanding the
64
occasional hat tip to the other line of jurisprudence.

sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (noting that although some canons “favor particular substantive results,”
Congress can rebut these presumptions by being clear in its contrary intent).
58. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Whether Congress has
in fact exercised that authority in these cases is a matter of statutory construction.”).
59. Through this presumption, courts constrain ambiguous legislation to the territorial
principle of prescriptive jurisdiction.
60. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
61. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
62. See infra Part III.
63. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Morrison to
support the proposition that absent clear intent, a statute has no extraterritorial application).
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A. Civil Application
In 1909 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, employed the
presumption against extraterritoriality in an antitrust dispute between
65
the American Banana Company and the United Fruit Company.
The Court, in setting the matter outside the scope of the Sherman
66
Act, emphasized the wholly foreign events of the dispute and “the
improbability of the United States attempting to make acts done in
67
Panama or Costa Rica [unlawful].” The two key elements of the
inquiry for the presumption against extraterritoriality can be
discerned in Holmes’s words: congressional intent and the situational
triggers of the presumption.
First, the congressional intent sufficient to rebut the presumption
68
has been understood to require more than “boilerplate” language or
69
negative inference, but it has not been deemed to require a “clear
70
statement rule” —as opposed to a “clear indication” of
71
extraterritoriality. Consistent with conventional judicial approaches
to statutory construction, courts have recourse to statutory context to
72
find intent, absent an express statement of geographic scope.
However, merely “possible” or “plausible” congressional intent

But see United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 302–03 (D.D.C. 2011) (relying on
Morrison in the same manner, but explicitly refusing to extend Morrison’s civil application to
the criminal context).
65. See Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 353, 357 (‘“All legislation is prima facie territorial.’”
(quoting Ex parte Blain, (1879) 12 Ch.D. 522 (C.A.) at 528 (Eng.))).
66. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7
(2012)).
67. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357. In fact, United Fruit allegedly induced Costa Rican
soldiers to seize a Panamanian plantation owned by American Banana. Id. at 354–55.
68. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 252 (1991) (“Title VII’s more limited,
boilerplate ‘commerce’ language does not support such an expansive construction of
congressional intent.”).
69. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) (noting that the presumption is not
rebutted when the statute “specifically addresses the issue of extraterritorial application in [an]
exception”).
70. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
71. Id. at 2878. The distinction between a clear-statement rule and a clear-indication rule is
subtle but, as Justice Marshall emphasized, it determines the tools of statutory interpretation
available to a court. See Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that
a clear-statement rule “relieves a court of the duty to give effect to all available indicia of the
legislative will,” as compared to clear indication, which permits access to “traditional tools” of
statutory construction).
72. See id. at 2883 (“Assuredly context can be consulted as well.”).
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proves insufficient to rebut the presumption. Second, courts
historically employed one of three tests—the conduct test, effects test,
or conduct-and-effects test—to determine whether any given set of
circumstances invoked the presumption’s operation, considering the
presumption’s inherent yet circumscribed application to
extraterritorial cases.
The conduct test was popularly associated with Justice Holmes’s
opinion in American Banana, wherein he advocated application of the
presumption whenever the relevant conduct occurred outside U.S.
74
borders. Conversely, the effects test suspended the presumption
when the consequent effects were felt domestically, regardless of
75
where the relevant conduct occurred. Having established two
73. See Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 253 (“If we were to permit possible, or even plausible,
interpretations . . . , there would be little left of the presumption.”); see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct.
at 2887 (dismissing the argument that an extraterritorial remedy’s consistency with customary
international law is wholly beside the point of what Congress wanted). Some pre-Morrison
courts, though, delved into whether Congress would have wanted a particular statute to govern
a particular case’s facts, that is, into the possible and plausible. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[In a case of predominately foreign
transactions, a court] must seek to determine whether Congress would have wished the precious
resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather
than leave the problem to foreign countries.”); cf. In re Alstom, 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 375
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (positing that the inquiry into extraterritorial intent is a policy-based
determination constrained only by reasonableness). Notwithstanding some critical
admonishments of such an elastic approach, courts demonstrated significant deference to the
“preeminent” jurisprudence of the Second Circuit that permitted such speculative analyses. See
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (1987),
abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869) (observing the D.C. Circuit’s concern that the Second
Circuit’s approach constituted a process of divination (citing Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (1987), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869)).
74. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he general and
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”). The Second Circuit famously applied
the conduct test to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act) to withhold statutory remedies when neither the fraudulent acts nor the securities
transactions occurred domestically. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). The Ninth Circuit also utilized the conduct test to constrain
application of federal copyright law to U.S.-based infringement, whereas the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York similarly reasoned that U.S. bankruptcy law did
not permit a debtor to claw back assets that had been preferentially transferred to creditors in
England. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 106–07 (1998).
75. Kelley Morris White, Note, Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Still Alive? Determining the
Scope of U.S. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Securities Cases in the Aftermath of Morrison v.
National Australia Bank, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1187, 1206 (2012). The Second
Circuit set out the effects test in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968),
abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869, as it attempted to determine whether the Exchange
Act’s antifraud provisions applied to misrepresentations by a Canadian company whose foreign
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inverse methods for identifying extraterritorial cases, the Second
Circuit combined the mutually independent conduct test and effects
76
test to establish a third—the conduct-and-effects test —following
which courts liberalized the presumption in two significant ways.
First, the two-pronged conduct-and-effects test provided for
extraterritorial application of domestic law when either the conduct or
77
the effect was territorial, thereby permitting courts to find sufficient
territoriality to avoid invocation of the presumption, although the
territorial connection would not have been sufficient under either the
78
conduct test or the effects test independently. Second, the test, as
applied by many courts, undermined the force of the presumption as
79
a per se rule. The Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison ultimately
disabused lower courts of this variegated approach to the
80
presumption, but in the meantime the presumption acquired a
different tone in the criminal context.
B. Criminal Application
The extraterritorial application of geoambiguous criminal
statutes has developed parallel to civil litigation, but it has operated
under a distinctive set of principles. Bowman suggested that
geoambiguous criminal statutes are exceptions to the rule and may
surmount the presumption more easily when certain types of offenses
81
are implicated. In Bowman the Supreme Court was presented with
facts alleging that four sailors conspired to submit fraudulent invoices
charging the Fleet Corporation—in which the United States was the
conduct had the ultimate effects of reducing its share value on a domestic exchange and, in turn,
harming investors. Id. at 208–09.
76. See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983), abrogated by
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
77. See id. (considering the Schoenbaum effects test and the Leasco conduct test as
independent and equally viable avenues for applying § 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
78. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated by Morrison,
130 S. Ct. 2869 (“[W]e hold that a sufficient combination of ingredients of the conduct and
effects tests is present in the instant case to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the district
court.”).
79. The Schoenbaum opinion went even further, diminishing the presumption and
converting it into evidence of legislative intent to rebut countervailing policy imperatives. See
Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206 (“[T]he usual presumption against extraterritorial application of
legislation . . . [does not] show Congressional intent to preclude application of the Exchange
Act . . . , when extraterritorial application of the Act is necessary to protect American
investors.”).
80. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
81. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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sole stockholder—for delivery of oil to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
82
although it had not actually been delivered in the amount described.
The criminal conspiracy was alleged to have occurred variously on the
83
high seas and in the port and city of Rio de Janeiro. Because the
relevant section of the Criminal Code did not expressly identify a
geographic scope, the Court was tasked with construing the statute’s
84
extraterritorial applicability. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the
Court, simultaneously acknowledged the background operation of the
presumption against extraterritoriality and asserted its inapplicability
to a class of criminal statutes, like those presented in the case: fraud
85
or obstruction directed against the government. Instead, the Court
concluded that Congress’s intent to criminalize extraterritorial
perpetration of those acts by U.S. citizens was inherent in the “nature
86
of the offense.”
The Court in Bowman provided only a terse explanation of what
characteristics the relevant crimes might share as a class, referencing
(1) obstruction and fraud offenses, (2) the perpetration of which is
not dependent on any given location, and (3) for which the potency
87
and value of the statute would suffer from strict territoriality.
Subsequent applications of the Bowman exception to the
presumption against extraterritoriality have emphasized or expanded,
88
to varying degrees, these enumerated characteristics. These varying
approaches can be classified under a threefold taxonomy. In some
cases the exception has been applied only to crimes against the
government directly, such as corruption, theft of government
property, assault on federal agents, and conspiracy to kill U.S.
89
officials. In other cases, criminal offenses exempted from strict
application of the presumption were those that impinged on
governmental interests, like inducement and encouragement of
82. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 95–96 (1922).
83. Id. at 96.
84. Id. at 97.
85. See id. at 98 (“[T]he same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal
statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government’s
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against
obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers
or agents.”).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Clopton, supra note 51, at 168.
89. Id. at 168–69 n.126 (citing, e.g., United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984)).
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unlawful immigration or fraudulent transfers in bankruptcy. Finally,
courts have found that some crimes are so inherently transnational as
91
to deserve the blessing of the Bowman exception. Typical crimes in
this final category include trafficking (human or drug) and
92
racketeering.
Beyond the types of crimes to which Bowman reasoning has
been applied, courts have innovated also with the manner in which
Bowman acts as an exception. The D.C. Circuit considered an
adequate rebuttal of the presumption to be a statutory implication
that the instant crime can be punished, not because of the locus of
commission, but because of the government’s inherent right to defend
93
itself against a class of crimes. The Second Circuit dispensed with the
94
clear-indication requirement when Bowman applies. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the nature-of-the-offense inquiry allowed it to
95
engage in speculative reasoning —effectively bootstrapping intent
based on the nature of the offense.
***
Until 2010, the civil and criminal lines of jurisprudence on the
presumption against extraterritoriality were weak constraints on the
effective scope of U.S. law, each in their own respect. The conductand-effects test, in civil cases, allowed courts to redefine whether a
law was really being applied extraterritorially, whereas the nature-ofthe-offense inquiry, in criminal cases, gave courts license to sanction
foreign violations. In this context, plaintiff-petitioners Russell Leslie
Owen, Brian Silverlock, and Geraldine Silverlock urged the Supreme

90. Id. at 169 n.129 (citing, e.g., United States v. Castillo-Felix, 539 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1976);
Stegeman v. United States, 425 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1970)).
91. See id. at 170 (“The ‘nature of the offense’ approach is commonly applied to crimes
that frequently manifest in transborder conduct or effects . . . .”).
92. Id. at 170 nn.136–38 (citing, e.g., United States v. Strevell, 185 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir.
2006) (per curiam); United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994)).
93. See United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 304 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Bowman
v. United States, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)).
94. See United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 211 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000) (asserting that the lack
of “clear evidence” of congressional intent is not dispositive of whether a statute should be
applied extraterritorially).
95. See Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 841 (“Congress would have intended that [the crime]
be applied extraterritorially to cases involving the murder of DEA agents abroad.”).
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Court to reverse the district court and Second Circuit in dismissing
96
their suit against National Australia Bank.
III. MORRISON: THE PRESUMPTION, REAFFIRMED AND
STREAMLINED
In Morrison the Court reaffirmed the importance of the
presumption against extraterritoriality and redirected the course of its
jurisprudence. The Court readdressed the long-lived debate about
congressional intent and situational triggers by advancing (1) a strict
approach to construing congressional intent and (2) a new test for
97
identifying the relevant situational triggers. The question before the
Morrison Court was whether U.S. federal courts had jurisdiction to
resolve the Australian plaintiffs’ complaint that an Australian
defendant, National Australia Bank (National), and several others
deceived investors regarding the value of a U.S. subsidiary’s assets,
98
which National was forced eventually to write down. Although
National listed a number of American Depositary Receipts on the
New York Stock Exchange, the plaintiffs purchased their common
99
stock of National on a foreign securities exchange. The district court
granted—and the Second Circuit affirmed—the defendants’ motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, given the at-most
tenuous link between the domestic conduct and the largely foreign,
100
fraudulent scheme.
Although the Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiffs could not
successfully sue National, it fundamentally disagreed with the lower
courts’ reasoning. The Morrison opinion began by disabusing the
lower courts of the belief that the presumption against
extraterritoriality was a function of a technical determination based
on subject matter jurisdiction, rather than a merits determination
101
based on an application of the law to particular facts. Moreover, the

96. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010).
97. See infra notes 104–10 and accompanying text.
98. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875–76. The Morrison plaintiffs sued National, Florida-based
mortgage company HomeSide Lending, National’s chief executive officer, and three of
HomeSide’s executives. Id. at 2876.
99. See id. (“[National’s] Ordinary Shares . . . are traded on the Australian Stock Exchange
Limited and on other foreign securities exchanges, but not on any exchange in the United
States. . . . As relevant here, [the plaintiffs] purchased National’s Ordinary Shares in 2000 and
2001 . . . .”).
100. Id. at 2876.
101. Id. at 2877.
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Court stated that the lower courts’ application of the presumption
was fundamentally flawed, thus recharacterizing both when the
102
presumption is animated and how the presumption is rebutted.
The Court in Morrison introduced a two-step test. At the first
step, the Court asked the threshold question of whether Congress
103
intended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to
104
apply abroad. As the Court firmly stated, “When a statute gives no
105
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” In
Morrison, the Court concluded that the Exchange Act had solely
domestic application, finding “no affirmative indication” that the
106
relevant statutory sections were intended to apply abroad. At the
second step, the Court inquired as to whether the Morrison facts
107
could be characterized as extraterritorial. This second element was
important because the presumption becomes a moot legal prohibition
if the relevant aspects of the dispute could be characterized as having
occurred domestically. The Court answered this question by turning
to the statutory focus in § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and by
concluding that Congress’s primary concern was “not upon the place
where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of
108
securities in the United States.” Therefore, notwithstanding the
plaintiffs’ assertions that certain substantive acts of the fraudulent
109
scheme occurred in the United States, the relevant aspects of the
matter—the transactions themselves—occurred outside of the United
110
States.
On its face Morrison strongly reaffirms the presumption against
extraterritoriality and provides some clear guidelines for its
application. First, the traditional tests are dead, and, in their stead, a

102. See id. at 2883–84 (noting that “some domestic activity” does not make the
presumption inapplicable if that activity is not the “focus” of the statute, and that the
presumption is not rebutted without a “clear indication” that Congress intended extraterritorial
effect).
103. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).
104. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 n.9 (“If § 10(b) did apply abroad, we would not need to
determine which transnational fraud it applied to; it would apply to all of them (barring some
other limitation).”).
105. Id. at 2878.
106. Id. at 2883.
107. Id. at 2884.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2883–84.
110. See id. at 2888 (“This case involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and all
aspects of the purchases complained of . . . occurred outside the United States.”).
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much narrower test based on a statutory “focus” has been blessed.
Second, although the Court gave space for inquiries into legislative
intent, it admonished against speculation as to what Congress would
112
have intended had it considered the present facts. The extent to
which this test precludes a purposivist finding of extraterritorial intent
113
is unclear, but it does suggest the need for a textual hook based on
more than “possible interpretations,” boilerplate language, or
114
negative inferences from statutory exceptions.
However, it also leaves some important issues unresolved or
ambiguous on closer examination. For example, there is little
indication of how far Morrison’s two-step analysis applies beyond the
115
Exchange Act. Even if it is generalizable to other statutes, Morrison
left open questions on how to determine a statute’s “focus.” In the
aftermath of Morrison, courts have struggled with the key
components of its directive: resolving a statute’s geoambiguity and
identifying the statutory focus. On this count, the Racketeer
116
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act has proved to

111. See id. at 2886. The Court has not clearly addressed whether the “focus” test can be
characterized as a reincarnation of one of the former traditional tests. Compare Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (speaking in terms of extraterritorial
“conduct”), and id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasizing the centrality of the “event or
relationship” of congressional focus), with William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L.
REV. 687, 690–92 (2011) (“Under Morrison . . . the location of the conduct is
irrelevant. . . . What is relevant instead is the location of the transaction affected by the
fraudulent conduct—in other words, the location of the effects. . . . Morrison substituted a
narrower effects test that turns solely on the location of the specific transaction affected by the
fraud.”). Rather, the relevance of conduct or effect likely turns on how an extraterritorial
statute characterizes the proscribed matter.
112. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (“The results of judicial-speculation-made-law—
divining what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court—
demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather than guess anew
in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases . . . .”).
113. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666 (examining the “historical background” of the ATS for
rebuttal evidence of extraterritorial application).
114. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882–83.
115. The Court partially answered this question in Kiobel by applying the presumption to
the ATS, but its ambiguous reference to the presumption’s principles—rather than the
presumption itself—and the ATS’s status as a jurisdictional statute leave some room for debate.
See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (invoking the presumption to constrain the ATS because of “the
principles underlying the canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts . . . under the ATS”).
116. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012).
The RICO Act is a hybrid statute that combats organized crime by imposing criminal and civil
liability for individuals or entities who engage in racketeering—a broadly inclusive set of
predicate acts characteristic of organized crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)—and provides a private
right of action. Gideon Mark, RICO’s Extraterritoriality, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 543, 547–48 (2013).
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be a fertile ground for post-Morrison litigation. In at least one case, a
117
court has had to reexamine the RICO Act’s geographical scope.
Similarly, courts have struggled to accurately determine whether the
circumstances implicating the statutory focus were extraterritorial.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has
found, in seemingly incongruous fashion, that the focus of the RICO
118
Act is the racketeering activity and, on another occasion, that its
119
focus is the racketeering enterprise.
More significant for present discussion, the court did not discuss
the holding’s implication for the Bowman exception. Courts have
been substantially less willing to consider how far to extend Morrison
beyond the civil context in which its strict holding is nested. In fact,
Morrison appears to have had little effect on determinations of
criminal liability: courts have consistently indicated, expressly or
120
implicitly, that Bowman survives Morrison.
IV. THE BOWMAN DOCTRINE’S FLAWED EXCEPTIONALISM AFTER
MORRISON
The Supreme Court in Morrison strongly reaffirmed the
presumption against extraterritoriality. That reaffirmation has had
121
considerable impact on the extraterritoriality of civil statutes,
whereas the effect has been less than substantial with respect to
criminal statutes, as to which the Bowman exception continues to
122
play a dominant role. Specifically, courts have been unwilling to
recognize in Morrison a restrictive or invalidating effect on

117. See Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348–49 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (holding that
Morrison abrogated the Eleventh Circuit’s prior holding that the RICO Act has extraterritorial
effect).
118. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 243–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
119. Cedeño v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2011) (disregarding
Morrison in favor of the reasoning in Bowman); United States v. Singhal, 876 F. Supp. 2d 82, 97
(D.D.C. 2012) (declining to extend Morrison beyond § 10(b), instead applying Bowman to
allegations of mail fraud); United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 7416975,
at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (“Morrison does not mention Bowman, nor does it explicitly
overrule it.”); United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Despite the
emphasis of Morrison that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies ‘in all cases,’
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has developed with nary a mention of Bowman . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
121. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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123

Bowman. Nevertheless, Bowman stands uneasily next to Morrison.
The latter offers a bright-line rule and is juxtaposed against the
former’s porous standard. Morrison espoused a strong disdain for
policy-based inquiries into whether extraterritorial application is
124
125
appropriate; Bowman appears to be premised on such an inquiry.
Whereas the Morrison opinion lacks any intimation that the Court
was concerned about the functioning of securities regulation when it
126
constrained the effect of the Exchange Act, application of Bowman
sometimes explicitly assesses the integral role that extraterritorial
127
application plays in a regulatory regime.
Not only do the circumstances call for courts to reconcile the
relationship between Morrison and Bowman, but there is also a
strong case for narrowing the influence of Bowman in statutory
interpretation of federal criminal law. The Bowman exception is
arguably a defunct doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence, at least
to the extent that it justifies a liberal inference of congressional intent.
Since establishing this exception to the presumption, members of the
Court have cited to Bowman for precedent on extraterritoriality
128
fourteen times, most recently in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford
129
Fire Insurance Co. v. California. Of those fourteen citations,
however, fewer than half can be (even generously) construed to rely
on Bowman for the proposition that extraterritorial application is

123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 112.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Congress
would have intended that [the crime] be applied extraterritorially to cases involving the murder
of DEA agents abroad.”).
126. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2894 n.12 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the Court’s decision may not extend to Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) enforcement action).
127. See United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2011) (“‘Congress is presumed
to intend extraterritorial application of criminal statutes where . . . restricting the statute to
United States territory would severely diminish the statute’s effectiveness.’” (quoting United
States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 87 (2d Cir. 2003))).
128. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 12 (1957); United States v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21 (1955); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344
U.S. 280, 291 (1952); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284 (1949); Vermilya-Brown Co. v.
Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948); United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946); Skiriotes
v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73–74 (1941); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 141, 143 (1933);
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 122 (1933); Goldsmith v. Zerbst, 1 RAPP 18, 19 (U.S. Nov.
18, 1932) (Cardozo, J., in chambers); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 425, 429, 437, 438
(1932); Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 511, 513, 520 (1927); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925).
129. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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justified by the nature of the offense, rather than by clear indication
130
of congressional intent. In fact, the Court has not used Bowman for
131
that latter purpose since 1952—in a dissenting opinion. Justice
Scalia’s own reference to Bowman, in Hartford Fire, was merely to
bolster the proposition that Congress has the constitutional authority
132
to extend U.S. laws extraterritorially.
This Part lays out the case for constraining the Bowman
exception, first, by describing the reasons why the Court repeatedly
invokes the presumption against extraterritoriality, and, then, by
arguing that, rather than permitting the Bowman exception to
operate effectively as an inverse presumption, courts should subject
extraterritorial application of federal criminal law to the strict
principles of Morrison, either by constraining the Bowman exception
to the facts of the original case or by abrogating the Bowman-style
reasoning completely. Finally, it challenges the two primary,
alternative approaches for reconciling Bowman and Morrison,
showing that restriction or invalidation is the better approach.
A. Rationales for the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Professor William S. Dodge identifies six discrete arguments that
133
have been advanced to rationalize the presumption. The first
rationale conceives of the presumption as a product of a customary
international law prohibition against extraterritorial laws and a
canonical disfavor for interpretations of domestic law that violate

130. See Bulova Watch, 344 U.S. at 291 (Reed, J., dissenting) (“There are . . . cases in which
a statement of specific contrary intent will not be deemed so necessary.”); Anderson, 328 U.S. at
703 (“Since the statute does not indicate where Congress considered the place of committing the
crime to be, the locus delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the
location of the act or acts constituting it.” (citations omitted)); Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 73–74 (“[A]
criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly injurious to the government, and are capable
of perpetration without regard to particular locality, is to be construed as applicable to citizens
of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though there be no express
declaration to that effect.”); Maul, 274 U.S. at 520 n.21 (referring to a list of “offenses . . . which
usually take place on the high seas”); Chisholm, 268 U.S. at 31 (“It contains no words which
definitely disclose an intention to give it extraterritorial effect, nor do the circumstances require
an inference of such purpose.”).
131. See Bulova Watch, 344 U.S. at 291 (Reed, J., dissenting) (“Where the case involves the
construction of a criminal statute ‘enacted because of the right of the Government to defend
itself against obstruction, or fraud . . . committed by its own citizens,’ it is not necessary for
Congress to make specific provisions that the law ‘shall include the high seas and foreign
countries.’” (quoting United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922))).
132. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Dodge, supra note 74, at 112–23.
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international law. Second, the conflict-of-laws basis asserts that the
law governing a controversy should be that of the forum wherein the
135
act occurred. Third, just as Congress presumably desires to avoid
conflict with international law, it is presumed to want to promote
136
international comity among foreign nations. According to that
137
rationale, the presumption acts as a conflict-avoidance tool.
Relatedly, the fourth rationale, separation of powers, grounds itself in
an argument about institutional competency; that is, courts are not
institutionally suited to assess the consequences of antagonistic
138
domestic law on foreign relations. Fifth, the presumption can act as
a signal to Congress about how courts will interpret statutes, thereby
providing a background rule on how to draft legislation that will
139
achieve the legislature’s intent. The final rationale assumes that
Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions, and that,
when Congress turns its legislative eye abroad, it is the exception that
140
proves the rule.
Dodge ultimately concludes that Congress’s domestic focus is the
only
valid
justification
for
the
presumption
against
141
extraterritoriality. However, Morrison’s strong reaffirmation of the
presumption provided evidence that the canon is justified not only
142
due to Congress’s domestic focus, but also because of the advantage
143
in providing Congress with stable background principles and the

134. Id. at 113–14. Dodge reasons that this has been undermined by evolution of
international law that sanctions geographic expansiveness of domestic law in certain situations.
Id.
135. Id. at 114–15. As the strength of Justice Holmes’s theory of vested rights eroded, so has
the strength of this rationale. See id. at 115 (observing that the conflict-of-laws jurisprudence has
changed since Justice Holmes’s time and that “one cannot say there is a prevailing theory of
conflicts”).
136. Id. However, Dodge questions the empirical basis for assuming that conflict between
domestic and foreign laws has a negative effect and whether Supreme Court jurisprudence has
consistently supported this rationale. Id. at 116–17.
137. Id. at 115.
138. Id. at 120.
139. Id. at 122.
140. Id. at 118.
141. See id. at 113 (“Only the notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic
concerns in mind is a valid reason for the presumption today.”).
142. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (“[The
presumption] rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to
domestic, not foreign matters.”).
143. See id. at 2881 (“[W]e apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable
background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”).
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Doctrinal
importance of maintaining prescriptive comity.
coherence, smart allocation of governmental authority, and fair notice
complement and strengthen the goals evinced by these three
rationales.
B. The Case for Narrowing the Bowman Exception
The Supreme Court should be dissuaded from perpetuating the
simultaneous and divergent doctrines embodied by Morrison and
145
Bowman. If the Court is to be believed that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is justified by Congress’s domestic focus, the
desirability of affording the legislature a stable interpretive
background, and the importance of prescriptive comity, then those
principles are best served, in turn, by doctrinal coherence, smart
allocation of governmental authority, and fair notice. The first of
these reasons raises relational considerations between civil and
criminal applications, whereas the latter two reasons address concerns
following from an expansive exception.
1. Doctrinal Coherence. There is an intuitive desirability of
imposing doctrinal coherence on the presumption against
extraterritoriality. There is also strong evidence within the Morrison
decision that the Court shares this sense. Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Morrison espouses a strong bright-line rule favoring the application
of the presumption, employing characteristically colorful metaphors
to convey his point: “[T]he presumption against extraterritorial
application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its
146
kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.”
Not only does constraining the Morrison rule to civil contexts leave

144. See id. at 2885 (“The probability of incompatibility with the applicable laws of other
countries is so obvious that if Congress intended such foreign application ‘it would have
addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures.’” (quoting EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991))).
145. This Note is not the first to consider the asymmetries of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Zachary Clopton, a former federal prosecutor, similarly discusses how
Bowman could be reconciled to Morrison’s stricter approach. See Clopton, supra note 51, at
185–91. However, he misses the opportunity to seriously address the reasons why reconciliation
is warranted, and he fails to propound a recommendation that sets the doctrines on equal
footing. See id. at 187 (recommending the possibility of “a softer presumption in criminal
cases”).
146. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
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criminal counterparts messy and rob criminal statutory construction
of the exacting direction afforded civil statutory construction, but it
also ignores the interrelationship between criminal and civil statutes
that makes a coherent approach to statutory interpretation appealing.
The doctrine’s current asymmetry and its drawbacks are readily
apparent. First, the extant formulation of the Bowman exception
causes unwieldy application of the presumption to criminal statutes. It
carries the potential to eviscerate any geographic limitation on
geoambiguous laws when the realities of a globalized and digital
148
society make enforcement more difficult. If a key element of the
standard is whether the nature of the offense makes unnecessary any
149
express, statutory reference to geographical scope, the number of
criminal offenses that could conceivably fall into that category grows
as technological advancement makes proximity less germane. This
argument does not belittle the importance, or understate the number,
of offenses dependent on geographic proximity, on the one hand.
Neither does it ignore the need for robust jurisdiction to counteract
increasingly transnational crime, on the other. In fact, courts
recognize that the criminal moniker does not talismanically invoke
150
Bowman’s blessing. Rather, such de jure asymmetry is concerning,
in this regard, because Bowman’s porous standard increasingly
becomes the exception that swallows the rule. Although the Bowman
exception has other relevant constraints—for example, Bowman
151
addressed fraud and obstruction —Bowman’s reasoning has been
more favored and permitted an expansive approach to the
152
exception. It is only slightly facetious to suggest that “street crime”
against private citizens may be one of the few categories of offenses
153
not excepted by Bowman. Moreover, if statutes are to be construed

147. See Clopton, supra note 51, at 168 (describing various degrees of breadth given to the
Bowman exception).
148. See Ellen S. Podgor & Daniel M. Filler, International Criminal Jurisdiction in the
Twenty-First Century: Rediscovering United States v. Bowman, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 585, 592
(2007) (observing that expansive criminal decisions based on Bowman “are deeply problematic
on a policy level, particularly in an era of globalization where many countries may seek to
enforce their respective interests both at home and abroad”).
149. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Bowman
does not hold that criminal statutes always apply extraterritorially.”).
151. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
152. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
153. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98 (“Crimes against private individuals or their property, like
assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement and frauds of all kinds, which
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in a geographically inconsistent manner, Congress should take the
154
lead.
Second, the paradigmatic civil and criminal cases governed by
Morrison and Bowman, respectively, are not so mutually independent
as to offer a compelling justification for why different standards
should apply. In fact, the two doctrines manifest salient
interrelationships. After all, the criminal cases based on Bowman
155
developed on the back of American Banana, a civil case. And,
despite refusals to overlay Morrison’s restrictive precepts on criminal
statutes, those opinions borrow generally from the civil context to
156
otherwise support their propositions.
Hybrid statutes best exemplify the interrelationships between
civil and criminal law. Many statutes—for example, the Sherman Act,
the RICO Act, and the FCPA—have criminal and civil liability
157
components. Imposition of a doctrinal distinction as a matter of law
158
could create incoherent application of these hybrid statutes, at least
insofar as the court is construing statutory provisions common to both
159
criminal and civil application. In FCC v. American Broadcasting
160
Co., the Court refused to allow the Federal Communications
161
Commission (FCC) to interpret the Communications Act of 1934
for civil regulatory purposes using a different standard than that used

affect the peace and good order of the community, must of course be committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the government where it may properly exercise it.”).
154. See infra notes 206–16 and accompanying text.
155. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98 (justifying its locus-based exception with reference to
American Banana, given that, although the case was a civil matter, the cause of action was based
on a hybrid statute with criminal and civil components); see also supra notes 63, 65–67 and
accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 813–15 (11th Cir. 2010) (building a legal
argument from precepts described in, for example, Morrison, Arabian Am. Oil, and Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)—all Supreme Court resolutions of civil
disputes).
157. See infra Part IV.C.
158. Cf. Jonathan Marx, Note, How To Construe a Hybrid Statute, 93 VA. L. REV. 235, 268
(2007) (“[T]he use of identical words is meaningful, and as such statutes employing identical
words should be construed consistently. Thus, if the civil and criminal provisions of a hybrid
statute are to have different scopes, it must be due to statutory mens rea . . . and not because
some conduct is within the scope of civil liability but does not also fulfill the actus reus elements
of the crime.”).
159. Id. at 241. But see Clopton, supra note 51, at 189 (dismissing the problems posed by
hybrid statutes because they are “the exception, rather than the rule”).
160. FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
161. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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in criminal prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice. It
would be anomalous to interpret a single statute in different ways,
163
according to the nature of the case or the parties involved, without a
clear indication that such an approach was intended by the
164
legislature. Professor Margaret Sachs has identified four reasons
justifying unified interpretations: congressional silence as to judicial
authority to apply different standards for civil and criminal purposes;
the presence of a single, undistinguished predicate wrong that forms
the basis of civil and criminal liability; the interpretive practice of
construing similar language similarly; and the difficulty in maintaining
165
constructive distinctions as to the same statutory text. In fact,
because of the unwillingness to extend Morrison to criminal contexts,
the same statute might be subject to two divergent rules of statutory
interpretation.
166
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) offers a relevant
example of how Morrison and Bowman could create inconsistent
enforcement of the same legislation. For example, the United States
167
criminalizes several forms of computer-related fraud and provides
168
for civil recovery by injured parties. Although multiple offenses
within the CFAA expressly identify “foreign commerce” as a
169
jurisdictional hook, the boilerplate quality of some of the language
makes it unclear whether such provisions would pass the Court’s
170
clear-indication requirement for civil suit. Thus, private parties
162. See Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. at 296 (“It is true . . . that these are not criminal cases, but
it is a criminal statute that we must interpret. There cannot be one construction for the [FCC]
and another for the Department of Justice. If we should give [the statute] the broad
construction urged by the [FCC], the same construction would likewise apply in criminal
cases.”).
163. See Marx, supra note 158, at 267 (“The fact that the same statutory language could bear
one meaning were civil canons applied to it, and another meaning were criminal canons applied
to it, does not mean that it can bear both.”).
164. Id. at 269.
165. Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory
Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1031–33.
166. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
167. Id. §§ 1030(a)–(f).
168. Id. § 1030(g).
169. E.g., id. §§ 1030(a)(6)–(7).
170. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 252 (1991) (“[B]oilerplate
‘commerce’ language does not support such an expansive construction of congressional
intent.”); cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(questioning whether the Sherman Act’s boilerplate jurisdictional language identifying
commerce with foreign nations would be sufficient, if the Act’s extraterritoriality were not
controlled by precedent).
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suffering real injury from the perpetration of computer fraud might
be barred by Morrison’s strict construction of intent. However, under
a liberal reading of Bowman, such a perpetrator might be subject to
criminal prosecution because of the lower threshold for finding
extraterritorial intent. Rather than applying different rules of
interpretation pursuant to the nature of the statute’s subject matter,
courts should utilize one form of the presumption—the one espoused
by the Morrison Court.
Returning to the Court’s justifications for the presumption, the
three rationales seem meaningful irrespective of the civil or criminal
171
context in which the presumption is being considered. There is no a
priori reason to believe that a domestic focus is more pressing when
drafting civil laws than criminal laws. If courts presume Congress to
172
be concerned primarily with the domestic effect of misconduct,
advocates of a strong Bowman exception are hard pressed to show,
without more, that Congress’s default inward focus is suspended
when addressing criminal penalties. Extraterritorial criminal
enforcement is similarly likely to endanger international comity. In
fact, criminal enforcement raises greater concerns for international
comity because it carries official imprimatur. Finally, given the
variegated and inconsistent manner in which courts have applied the
Bowman exception, important strides are made toward providing a
stable interpretive background for Congress if the presumption
against extraterritoriality were collapsed into a unified doctrine.
2. Allocation of Authority. Wrapped within the discussion of an
exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality is an
argument regarding allocation of authority. In some settings such
allocation may be discussed in terms of nondelegation or deliberative
government. Of course, Bowman did not speak in these terms.
However, whatever the terminology, the presumption against
extraterritoriality tends to force careful consideration before
expanding the breadth of the government’s sanctioning power. By
contrast, without a consistent rule for approaching statutory
ambiguity, unclear provisions have the potential to transfer
lawmaking power to the interpreting body. Traditional application of

171. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.
172. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (“[The
presumption] rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to
domestic, not foreign matters.”).
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the presumption against extraterritoriality might be understood, in
one sense, as the judiciary’s refusal to accept latent authority to
broadly construe geoambiguous statutes.
In nondelegation terms the exception to the presumption, then,
reverses that approach by normalizing the acceptability of delegationby-ambiguity to the courts or the executive. At the extreme,
delegation-by-ambiguity can run afoul of the constitutional principle
of separation of powers: the Constitution’s procedural safeguards are
173
weakened; the public is robbed of the meaningful input of both
174
political branches of government; and, in the case of executive
interpretation, executive interests in robust enforcement and fair
175
interpretation stand in conflict. This Note does not make the
argument that the Bowman exception suborns unconstitutional
176
delegation. At one level, such an argument is not a winning one.
Pragmatically, though, the better argument approaches the
asymmetry from a higher level of generality: prudential and
constitutional considerations of smart allocation of authority to define
a statute’s scope militate against assigning such authority to the
executive branch. Three corollaries follow: First, geoambiguity—as a
form of congressional silence on a statute’s geographic scope—should
not be understood as a presumptive transfer of authority to the
executive. Second, ingrained legal principles belie the prudence of de
facto—if not de jure—transfer of interpretive authority. Finally,
under the specter of single-branch expansion of criminal statutes, the
canon of constitutional avoidance should prevent liberal
constructions of geoambiguous statutes absent congressional input.
Important scholarship by Professors Eric Posner and Cass
Sunstein has taken the contrary position, asserting that courts should
defer to the executive in interpreting geoambiguous criminal
177
statutes. This scholarship rests heavily on the Supreme Court’s own

173. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 207–09 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
176. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (“We
might say that the conventional [nondelegation] doctrine has had one good year, and [now 224]
bad ones (and counting).”).
177. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 1170, 1173 (2007) (“[C]ourts should . . . draw on established principles of administrative law
to permit executive interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms to overcome the international
relations doctrines.”).
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recognition of the presumption’s basis in international comity. At
first blush, the prescriptive-comity argument appears to run counter
to this Note’s recommendations. Prescriptive comity is concerned,
after all, that extraterritorial laws may inadvertently cause foreign179
relations frictions. The presumption, as a court-imposed kill switch,
prevents accidental frictions of international proportions. The clear
indication of extraterritorial application—required to rebut the
presumption—signals that the political branches have weighed the
risks to foreign relations and made a deliberate determination that a
180
law’s global enforcement has transcendent value.
The Posner-Sunstein proposal would assign sufficient weight to
the executive branch’s interpretations to override international
181
relations doctrines,
such as the presumption against
182
extraterritoriality. The executive branch has certain structural
advantages over Congress when it comes to weighing the risks of
183
extraterritorial application of law against the advantages. After all,
the executive branch has the benefit of (1) access to information due
to being on the frontline of enforcement and having a dedicated
bureaucratic cadre assessing foreign relations and legal matters, and
(2) timely action and a unified front.
Essentially disagreeing with the first two corollaries described
earlier, Posner and Sunstein have advocated for courts to defer to the
executive branch on the application of foreign-relations doctrines to
the same degree that courts accord deference to administrative
agencies under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
184
Council, Inc. —either under formal Chevron analysis or by analogy

178. See id. (characterizing the discussed doctrines as the “international comity doctrines”).
179. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It serves to protect
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord.”).
180. Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885 (2010) (“The probability of
incompatibility with the applicable laws of other countries is so obvious that if Congress
intended such foreign application ‘it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign
laws and procedures.’” (quoting Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 256)).
181. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1173 (“Our more ambitious goal is to suggest
that courts should generally draw on established principles of administrative law to permit
executive interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms to overcome the international relations
doctrines.”).
182. See id. at 1179 (categorizing the presumption against extraterritoriality as a comity
doctrine).
183. Id. at 1202, 1205.
184. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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to Chevron principles. They build their argument upon the concepts
of executive competence and “constitutional warrant” for balancing
policy interests and foreign relations considerations in the absence of
186
a clear congressional mandate. According to such a Chevron-based
argument, deference would follow from delegation because “courts
presume that, when Congress charges an agency with administering
an ambiguous statute, Congress is delegating lawmaking power to the
187
agency.” Applying the two-step Chevron inquiry, the presumption
against extraterritoriality would not stand as an automatic bar when a
court cannot clearly discern whether Congress expressed a preference
188
for the statute’s geographical scope. In such cases, Posner and
Sunstein would say that courts should defer to the government’s
interpretations of geographical scope, so long as they were
189
reasonable. In the alternative, the Posner-Sunstein proposal would
be to ascribe such deference to the executive branch’s institutional
competence
as
to
surmount
the
presumption
against
190
extraterritoriality in any case. This deference theory effectively
rationalizes the approach already preferred by many courts when
191
interpreting Bowman. It is the wrong approach for several reasons.
First, despite the appeal to competence and accountability,
presumptive delegation through Chevron deference is an
inappropriate approach to reconciling the Bowman exception and
Morrison. A pro-deference argument grounded in Chevron’s theory
of presumptive delegation must first pass the wrinkle added by United
192
States v. Mead Corp. In the wake of Chevron, deference to agency
resolution of statutory ambiguity was understood to be based upon a
legal fiction that ambiguity was an implied delegation of interpretive

185. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1204–05.
186. Id. at 1177. They bolster their advocacy by attacking the value of international comity
doctrines; that the benefits of deference to foreign regulations do not always outweigh the costs.
Id. at 1185.
187. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 670
(2000).
188. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1198 (“The international relations doctrines
should not operate as constraints on the executive under Chevron Step One.”).
189. See id. (“If the executive’s interpretation is unreasonable, of course, it will be invalid
under Step Two . . . .”).
190. Id. at 1205.
191. See supra notes 93–95, 120 and accompanying text.
192. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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Mead, not precluding the possibility of implied
authority.
delegation, imposed a threshold determination of actual legislative
intent to delegate interpretive authority before applying Chevron
194
deference. That determination is based, namely, on indications that
Congress delegated the agency to act with the force of law and that
195
the agency acted pursuant to that authority. The Mead Court
identified, as a touchstone of legislative intent, the statutorily
enumerated administrative procedure by which an agency was to act:
statutory mandate to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
196
rulemaking being a sufficient example of such delegation. Such
formal administrative or notice-and-comment procedures are notably
absent from criminal prosecutions for extraterritorial conduct.
Criminal statutes typically do not direct or authorize the Attorney
General to engage in formalized procedures—drawing on public
input—to prosecute violations of the statutes’ prescripts. Rather,
federal prosecutors satisfy their statutory responsibilities through the
interpretative and adjudicative authority of the judicial branch.
Absent this determination, Mead should assign merely persuasive
authority, rather than Chevron’s dispositive authority, to the
197
government’s interpretation of geoambiguous statutes.
Second, even if executive branch interpretations have persuasive
198
authority—as Posner and Sunstein argue in the alternative —a
practical flaw with the competence argument undermines the
reasonableness of prioritizing prescriptive comity. There is plausible
foundation to believe that the executive branch, as a whole, has

193. See id. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that Chevron was previously justified by
“a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by
an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency”
(quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996))).
194. See id. at 237 (majority opinion) (justifying use of Chevron deference when there are
indications of actual congressional intent to delegate legally binding authority).
195. See id. at 226–27 (“[Agency action] qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority.”).
196. See id. at 227 (“Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by
an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some
other indication of a comparable congressional intent.”).
197. See id. at 228, 237 (discussing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), as the
default deference standard).
198. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1205 (“[I]n the domain of foreign relations,
the approach signaled in Chevron should apply even if the executive is not exercising delegated
authority to make rules or conduct adjudications.”).
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greater institutional competence than the legislative or judicial branch
when it comes to foreign relations. However, it does not follow
necessarily that any particular enforcement agency has greater
institutional competence in foreign relations or that it will even
consider implications for foreign relations when prosecuting
199
extraterritorial misconduct. Moreover, Professors Derek Jinks and
Neal Kumar Katyal have rejected the Posner-Sunstein proposal by
disputing that the executive branch’s legal positions enjoy any
comparative
advantage
of
institutional
competence
and
accountability, absent assurances that bureaucratic expertise was
200
actually involved in the development of those positions.
Third, although the presumption against extraterritoriality is
concerned with international comity, harmony is not its exclusive
201
rationale. Multiple Supreme Court opinions have employed the
presumption using the premise that Congress legislates primarily with
202
a concern for domestic matters. Moreover, the presumption is also a
203
manifestation of the Court’s disdain for judicial speculation. It sets
out for Congress a “background rule”—a reliable expectation—
against which legislation can be drafted to achieve what Congress
204
actually intends. Therefore, the presumption is now at least as much
about faithful agency as it is about achieving desirable outcomes. The
Posner-Sunstein argument unjustifiably prioritizes prescriptive
comity, to the exclusion of the presumption’s other goals.
199. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 1230, 1280 (2007) (“[W]hen claims of a ‘unitary executive’ become so strong that they
permit a President to compress or eliminate agency processes through political influence, and to
bypass interagency debate altogether, deference is not being awarded on the basis of
expertise. . . . To be sure, the President has a State Department, a Defense Department, law-ofwar experts, and the Judge Advocates General at his disposal, but each of these entities can be
cut out under streamlined presidential decision-making.”).
200. See id. at 1281 (“To be sure, the President has accountability advantages (and
comparative expertise advantages vis-à-vis the judiciary), but he does not possess those same
advantages over Congress. In a case . . . in which the claims pit the powers of Congress against
those of the President, deference to the latter can be appropriate, at most, only when the
executive can present the argument as the product of deliberative and sober bureaucratic
decision-making.”).
201. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010) (“The canon or
presumption applies regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between [an] American
statute and a foreign law . . . .”).
202. Id. at 2877; Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
203. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (observing the per se nature of the presumption against
extraterritoriality as an advantage over “judicial-speculation-made-law”).
204. Id.
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Fourth, the executive branch, empowered with the authority to
enforce the law, has important and inherent discretion to decline
205
enforcement in a given case. If the executive branch, generally, and
the statutory enforcement agencies, like the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) or Department of Justice, specifically, enjoy a
comparative advantage in institutional competence in foreign
relations, it is an advantage better expressed by discrete executive
decisions not to enforce the law, rather than a one-time decision to
categorically extend an offense’s prescriptive scope. It is a much less
controversial principle to permit discretionary, instance-specific
nonenforcement of express statutory prohibitions, than to permit
discretionary, wholesale expansion of a geoambiguous statute with
the potential to cause international friction. The latter undermines
the theory that the executive branch is actually developing a statutory
interpretation with vagarious and sensitive international concerns in
mind. Therefore, rather than justifying presumptive recourse to
executive interpretation, existing law and the Court’s concern with
international law suggest that the motivating principles behind a
strict, civil presumption against extraterritoriality are similarly
applicable to the presumption’s criminal function.
Captured within this discussion of the appropriate allocation of
authority is an argument for using the presumption against
extraterritoriality to catalyze a constitutional preference for a
deliberative government, as both a protection for weak and
disfavored groups—of which criminals seemingly are included—and
as a check on the executive branch’s power. In that regard, the
current dichotomy of a presumption against extraterritoriality
applying robustly in the civil context but markedly less so in the
criminal context is concerning. Some statutory-interpretation
principles are rooted in the concept of providing procedural
206
protections to groups subject to harsh treatment, such as criminals.
In this regard, interpretive canons—like the presumption against
205. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“The Attorney General and
United States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.”
(quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985))). “In our system, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)
(emphasis added).
206. See Sunstein, supra note 176, at 334 (noting a principle underlying some canons of
construction that “require[s] a congressional judgment if a group perceived as weak or
deserving is going to be treated harshly”).
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extraterritoriality—play a beneficial role in ensuring that important
decisions are made with the input of both political branches. As
Sunstein argues: “[T]he nondelegation canons have the salutary
function of ensuring that certain important rights and interests will
not be compromised unless Congress has expressly decided to
compromise them. Thus . . . it is entirely reasonable to think that for
certain kinds of decisions, merely executive decisions are not
207
enough.” Sunstein considers the interpretive canons to be the
208
“modern nondelegation” doctrine. The canons espouse a preference
for the involvement of both political branches in sensitive decisions,
209
such as ones that would apply criminal laws beyond U.S. borders. If
Congress is responsible for enacting the statute, it is reasonable to
expect it to have a role in determining the scope of the risk its
legislation poses to foreign relations.
Returning to the matter of deference to the executive branch,
Jinks and Katyal express concern that deference to agency expertise
in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms, especially in the criminal
210
context, is a one-way ratchet; enforcement agencies will always
interpret a geoambiguous statute expansively, especially given their
subsequent discretion as to whether to prosecute any particular
violation. Even Posner and Sunstein acknowledge this concern
regarding self-serving interpretation, observing that deference may
not be deserved when the interpretation is the product of a “mere
211
litigation position.” As a matter of course, the legal proposition that
an ambiguous federal criminal statute should be interpreted as
enforceable abroad is likely to arise almost exclusively in the course
of litigation or comparable adversarial contexts. There is a weaker
argument that permitting the executive branch to determine the
geographical scope of an ambiguous criminal statute allows the
executive to aggrandize both legislative power to prescribe the scope
of a statute—when it has not clearly and narrowly assigned that
207. Id. at 338.
208. Id. at 342.
209. See id. at 333 (“If statutes are to receive extraterritorial application, it must be as a
result of a deliberate congressional judgment to this effect. The central notion here is that
extraterritorial application calls for extremely sensitive judgments involving international
relations; such judgments must be made via the ordinary lawmaking process (in which the
President of course participates). The executive may not make this decision on its own.”).
210. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 199, at 1266 n.132 (“What undergirds the traditional
reluctance is the fear of presidential self-dealing—that a President can interpret a statute to
expand his own power over individuals.”).
211. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1214–15.
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discretion to the executive—and judicial power to interpret
212
congressional intent.
Moreover, the asymmetric application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality raises serious constitutional concerns
213
214
related to due process and the separation of powers. These
concerns should cause courts, at a minimum, to reconsider an acrossthe-board application of the Bowman exception. Channeling the
words of Chief Justice Burger in National Labor Relations Board v.
215
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, “[I]n the absence of a clear expression
of Congress’ intent . . . , we decline to construe [an] [a]ct in a manner
that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive
216
questions arising out of the guarantees of the [Constitution].” Given
the far-reaching implications of deciding a case with latent
constitutional questions, a narrow construction of a statute raising
such questions has at least two benefits. First, it avoids the creation of
precedent on a constitutional matter that was neither directly
addressed nor fully developed by the case. Second, it forces Congress
to deliberate on the precise issue of whether a given statute was
enacted with extraterritorial effect.
Nevertheless, a tool of constitutional avoidance is a blunt
instrument. Although using the presumption to avoid difficult
constitutional questions may ensure that constitutional rights are not
burdened by hard-to-reverse interpretations, it also has the potential
for “distorting . . . policy choices” and thwarting the democratic will
217
of Congress. For that reason, the Court has insisted that the
constitutional avoidance canon not be employed to construe a statute
in such a way as to impose a policy that is disingenuous or not
218
plausible on the statute’s face. A criminal mirror to Morrison’s strict
presumption against extraterritoriality would have the additional
212. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (“It is this concern of
encroachment and aggrandizement that has animated our separation-of-powers
jurisprudence . . . . Accordingly, we have not hesitated to strike down provisions of law that
either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate Branches
or that undermine the authority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch.”).
213. See infra Part IV.B.3.
214. See supra notes 205–12.
215. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
216. Id. at 507.
217. David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the New Nondelegation
Doctrine, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002).
218. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (noting that “the saving construction”
may not be disingenuous to a statute’s plain meaning).
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salutary effect of acting as a proxy canon of constitutional avoidance.
That is, geoambiguous statutes that can plausibly be interpreted as
having no extraterritorial effect would have none and, thereby, would
avoid the constitutional questions of due process and separation of
powers. The criminal statutes at issue do not raise the Court’s concern
219
for “disingenuous evasion” of the statutes’ policies. Rather, these
statutes are facially ambiguous as to geographical scope; that is, their
express provisions do not definitively resolve the reach of the
statutes’ prescriptions. Application of Morrison’s narrow test would
ensure that a court engages in a statute-by-statute examination of the
criminal provisions to determine whether the focus of those
provisions is domestic or extraterritorial.
The circumstances in which the presumption against
extraterritoriality is considered do not justify accepting as dispositive
the government’s interpretation of geoambiguity. The presumption
against extraterritoriality is not solely concerned with foreign
relations. Neither is it obvious that the executive has, in practice, a
clear comparative advantage in weighing the costs and benefits of
foreign enforcement. Rather, even if it does, such a cost-benefit
determination is best expressed in selective nonenforcement.
Moreover, foreign-relations risks posed by legislation should be
considered and resolved through the input of both political branches.
3. Fair Notice. The final legal point that supports subordination
of the Bowman exception to Morrison is not complex, but it is
nonetheless weighty. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed a
principle of fair notice when criminal statutes contain ambiguous or
220
inconsistent terms. This concept of fair notice—often manifesting as
the rule of lenity—is, at its heart, a policy animated by due process
and concerned with forcing the legislature to clearly condemn
conduct as criminal as to afford law-abiding citizens the opportunity
221
to bring their behavior into conformity. Although the Court has

219. Id. (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985)).
220. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (describing the rule of
lenity as a basis for construing a criminal statute favorably to the defendant when all attempts to
identify congressional intent still result in “‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language
and structure of the Act’” (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974));
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (“‘[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.’” (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808,
812 (1971))).
221. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348.
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constrained the use of the defendant-friendly rule of lenity, judicial
regard for fair notice, generally, thrives. Moreover, the potential for
extraterritorial application of a criminal statute with intractably
geoambiguous scope to raise due process claims is glaring. When
courts applying the Bowman exception circumvent findings of
congressional intent by resorting to speculative judgments of how
223
Congress would have wanted a statute to apply, such application
would seem to be premised on the type of “grievous ambiguity or
uncertainty” that the Supreme Court considers a precondition before
224
enforcement yields to the rule of lenity.
The presumption against extraterritoriality, when applied
consistently, operates as a lenity-rule proxy by construing
geoambiguous statutes against the government. Harking back to the
earlier discussion of doctrinal consistency and coherence, the
protection that due process principles afford to criminal defendants
would be manifestly inverted if Bowman and its progeny were
distinguished from Morrison according to subject matter or actor.
Given the default assumption that Congress legislates primarily with
225
a domestic focus, principles of due process should demand that a
law—civil or criminal—provide fair notice of departure from that
baseline. The presumption against extraterritoriality enforces that
requirement for civil statutes by way of its clear-indication
226
requirement. However, Bowman watered down such notice by
asserting, as a matter of law, that nature-of-the-offense inquiries do
227
not require a strained construction of statutory intent.
Given the greater consequences of criminal sanction and the
presence of higher persuasion standards in criminal trials, it would be

222. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (rejecting a rule-of-lenity
argument over the dissent’s claims that robust dispute within the Court over the meaning of
“carry” inherently implied residual ambiguity that should be resolved in favor of the defendant);
Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463–64 (suggesting that, absent an “absurd or glaringly unjust” statutory
construction, there is no “reasonable doubt” of Congress’s intent sufficient to invoke the rule of
lenity).
223. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Congress
would have intended that [the crime] be applied extraterritorially to cases involving the murder
of DEA agents abroad.” (emphasis added)).
224. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463 (quoting Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 831) (quotation mark
omitted).
225. See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
226. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“When a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”).
227. Clopton, supra note 51, at 191.
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an unusual doctrine that provided for extraterritorial application of
geoambiguous criminal laws using less stringent indications of
228
congressional intent than similar civil laws. Similarly, permitting
public actors greater leeway than private actors with respect to
extending the application of statutes with geoambiguous scope may
provide for greater recognition and promotion of government
interests, but it provides little support for the proposition that a
potential violator of statutory provisions will be on notice as to a law’s
extraterritorial application.
C. Distinction-Based Alternatives to Narrowing the Bowman
Exception
Although the foregoing arguments march toward the conclusion
that Morrison and the Bowman exception should be reconciled
through the latter’s restriction or abrogation, its subordination to
Morrison is not the only option. Courts could perpetuate the
Bowman exception by distinguishing Morrison on the grounds that
either (1) criminal subject matter warrants special statutory rules, or
(2) public actors deserve greater latitude than private actors to pursue
statutory violations abroad. As this Section demonstrates, however,
these alternatives do not withstand scrutiny.
1. Criminal-Civil Distinctions. One option for a BowmanMorrison distinction is on the basis of criminal and civil subject
matters. Others have observed that “[w]hile Morrison has the
potential to extend to criminal cases, . . . the broad spectrum of cases
to which Morrison may be extended will probably not include
229
criminal cases.”
This distinction could establish the Bowman
exception as a subject-matter exception to Morrison’s general
230
presumption or it could doctrinally sever the relationship between
civil and criminal applications of the statutory interpretation of
extraterritorial application. The latter option finds support in some
courts’ opinions post-Morrison.

228. See Marx, supra note 158, at 244–45 (noting the dual purposes of the rule of lenity to be
“prevent[ing] excessive delegation of criminal lawmaking power to the judiciary” and
“[s]kewing statutory construction toward under- rather than overcriminalization [to] help[]
ensure that no defendant is convicted for behavior that the legislature did not intend to
criminalize”).
229. White, supra note 75, at 1237.
230. Clopton, supra note 51, at 181.
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The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
Morrison-type reasoning in favor of the Bowman-based exception in
231
In that case, Neil Campbell, an
United States v. Campbell.
Australian national indicted for soliciting a bribe from a
subcontractor on a U.S. government–funded project in Afghanistan,
moved to dismiss his indictment because the substantive statute
232
lacked explicit extraterritorial application. The district court denied
the motion, concluding that, notwithstanding the per se application of
the Morrison presumption, the Court’s opinion applied directly to
civil matters and lacked any indication of consequence to criminal
233
cases.
The Second Circuit substantially agreed with this position in
affirming the conviction of a man charged with sexually abusing his
minor daughter in conjunction with travel between the United States
234
and Belgium. Although the court concluded that the textual
reference to “foreign commerce” and the statute’s grammatical
235
structure provided sufficient evidence of extraterritorial intent, the
court questioned whether the presumption against extraterritoriality
236
should apply at all. Instead, the court cited sister-circuit precedent
to suggest that the presumption against extraterritoriality is either
237
weaker or nonexistent in the criminal context.
The most important rejoinder to the alternative, criminal-civil
proposition is that the resulting doctrine would be to formalize the
status quo; it would necessarily continue to ignore all of the foregoing
concerns regarding the existing doctrinal asymmetries. Additionally,
it would functionally liberalize the Bowman exception beyond how it
is currently applied. Bowman, by its terms, does not apply to all

231. United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2011).
232. Id. at 296–97. Campbell was indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) for
“solicitation of a bribe by an agent of an organization receiving more than $10,000 in federal
funds.” Id. at 296.
233. See id. at 303 (“Despite the emphasis of Morrison that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies ‘in all cases,’ recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has developed with
nary a mention of Bowman and has predominately involved civil statutes.” (citation omitted)).
234. See United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2011).
235. Id. at 65–66.
236. Id. at 66.
237. See id. (“[T]here is reason to doubt that the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies [here] at all. . . . ‘Bowman does not hold that criminal statutes always apply
extraterritorially’ and instead requires ‘judges . . . [to] consider the language and function of the
prohibition’ . . . .” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. LeijaSanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2010))).
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238

and, though some courts have generously
criminal statutes,
construed Bowman’s applicability, even those progressive
applications have not made the exception completely coextensive
239
with the criminal context. The inadvertent result of such a doctrinal
division could be that a number of new classes of criminal offenses
could be afforded extraterritorial effect.
2. Public-Private Actor Distinctions. The second option, a publicprivate actor distinction, transcends the criminal-civil divide by
recognizing that many civil-enforcement agencies share relevant
240
characteristics with criminal-enforcement authorities.
This
alternative manner of preserving the Bowman exception and
distinguishing Morrison finds support in Morrison itself in the final
footnote of Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion. Hidden in his
241
disparagement of the Court’s transactional test, the concurring
Justice alerted the reader to the fact that “[t]he Court’s opinion does
not . . . foreclose the [SEC] from bringing enforcement actions in
additional circumstances, as no issue concerning the Commission’s
242
authority is presented by this case.”
According to Justice Stevens’s ostensibly narrow interpretation
of Morrison’s holding, the SEC may have been able to bring the same
243
case in the plaintiffs’ stead with a different result. Justice Stevens
cites two reasons for distinguishing private suits from public
enforcement of the Exchange Act: a public actor’s sensitivity to
244
international comity and the fewer restrictions on how it effectuates
245
the statute’s prohibitions. This public-private actor distinction has
238. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
240. For example, the SEC pursues civil enforcement of securities law violations.
241. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2895 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hile the clarity and simplicity of the Court’s test may have some salutary
consequences, like all bright-line rules it also has drawbacks.”).
242. Id. at 2894 n.12.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2891–92 & n.7 (citing F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155,
171 (2004)). “‘[P]rivate plaintiffs often are unwilling to exercise the degree of self-restraint and
consideration of foreign governmental sensibilities generally exercised by the U.S.
Government.’” Empagran, 542 U.S. at 171 (alteration in original) (quoting Joseph P. Griffin,
Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 194 (1999)).
245. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2894 n.12 (“The Commission’s enforcement
proceedings . . . differ from private § 10(b) actions in numerous potentially relevant
respects . . . .”); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 12–13, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL 719337 (“[T]he SEC’s enforcement
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received greater support since passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
246
which amended the
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Exchange Act to expressly permit government agencies to bring
247
securities-fraud cases premised on extraterritorial jurisdiction.
248
Anecdotally, this amendment—a response to Morrison —supports
the argument that, if Congress had to clarify its intent that a statute
should operate differently for public actors than private actors, courts
should adjust their interpretive guidelines accordingly.
Nevertheless, this alternative proposal is imprudent, too.
Ascribing Bowman’s lax prohibition on extraterritorial application to
public actors does not resolve the difficulties associated with fair
notice and assigning different statutory constructions to the same text.
Moreover, it only exacerbates concerns regarding appropriate
allocation of governmental authority, as more public agencies would
enjoy the Bowman exception’s more easily surmounted presumption
against extraterritoriality.
Both the subject-matter-based and actor-based approaches to
preserving the Bowman exception and distinguishing Morrison have
at least anecdotal support in law. However, perpetuating the broad
Bowman exception, in either the criminal or public-actor context, is
not the best approach to clarifying the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Although these alternative proposals impose
distinctions that do not currently exist, they are quite literally
distinctions without a difference: the presumption against
extraterritoriality under either proposal would exhibit all of the same
problems identified in this Note without offering marginal benefits. It
would behoove courts to address the existing doctrinal inconsistencies
by narrowing or abrogating the Bowman exception, rather than
making an artificial distinction.

activities are not limited by the additional constraints that apply to private suits. Unlike private
plaintiffs, . . . the Commission is not required to prove that any investor actually relied on the
misrepresentations or that the misrepresentations caused any investors to lose money. . . . The
SEC has similarly broad and unqualified authority to bring an action for injunctive relief . . . .”).
246. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
247. White, supra note 75, at 1228–29 (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act § 929P(b)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012))).
248. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Extraterritoriality is a common and robust characteristic of U.S.
law. Yet, no branch of government should ignore the consequences of
the extraterritorial application of domestic law. Justice Brennan
noted one scholar’s—assumedly tongue-in-cheek—observation that
“our country’s three largest exports are now ‘rock music, blue jeans,
249
and United States law.’” However, the Court has clearly stated and
affirmed that such “legal exports” are not a given; sole domesticity is
a hurdle to be surmounted only by clear legislative indication.
For the reasons described—namely doctrinal coherence, smart
allocation of government authority, and fair notice concerns—that
hurdle should not be lower in the criminal context than in the civil
one. Morrison provides a strong roadmap for construing
geoambiguous statutes, and, although its precedent is currently
binding only in the civil context, its principles and analysis should be
extended to the criminal context, as well, thereby narrowing or
abrogating the Bowman exception. Absent from the Bowman line of
cases are persuasive reasons for relaxing the constraints of the
presumption against extraterritoriality. That absence is problematic.
And, in light of the reasons given in this Note, that absence should be
fatal.

249. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 281 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United
States Law, 14 INT’L LAW. 257, 257 (1980)).

